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AN EXAMINATION 



A PRIORI PRINCIPLES 



\S SUM ED BY 



DR. CHARLBS HODGK 



IN HIS TREATISE ON 



SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 



BT WILLIAM MACON COLEMAN. 






WASHINGTON, D. C, 

BEARDSEEY & SNODGRASS, PRINTERS. 

1874. 



AX EXAMINATION OF THE A PRIORI PRINCIPLES 

ASSUMED BY DR. CHARLES HODGE IN HIS 

TREATISE ON SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 



Dr. Charles Hodge, Professor of Theology at the Seminary at 
Princeton, New Jersey, has recently published a work entitled, 
" Systematic Theology.'' which we may justly regard as the most 
authoratative exposition extant of what is commonly known as 
Orthodox Protestantism. Dr. Hodge is well qualified for such a 
work. With large natural gifts, he has given a long life to 
study. His learning is comprehensive in his domain. He is 
familiar with the history of opinion and with the modern theo- 
ries of science and philosophy. For nearly half a century he 
has been before the religious world in synods and assemblies and 
has been busy with his pen in all the departments of his profes- 
sion. His long continued position as Professor is of itself an evi- 
dence of the esteem and respect in which he is held by his fellow 
Presbyterians, and perhaps it would not be going too far to say 
that the whole Protestant world agrees in pointing him out as its 
best living representative. His work is the fruit of his ripest 
study and experience as commentator, professor, essayist and 
controversialist. 

The publication of this work is a cause of gratification to all 
who are interested in matters of philosophy and religious faith. 
It is especially so to Catholics. It puts into definite shape and 
form the doctrines of Protestantism as they are held and taught 
to-day. And it supports them with all the cogency by which 
they possibly can be supported. All that the ability of the last 
three centuries could do in this behalf, all that modern research 
could do, all that the mind of the accomplished author himself 
could suggest — all have been combined in their defence. Protest- 
antism can say nothing better. It is as able and as authoritative 
an exposition as Protestantism is capable of making. It is as 
such a representative exposition that it will be considered in this 
brief essay. 

It is the purpose of the present writer to confine himself 
strictly to a few critical points upon which the whole theory of 
the "Systematic Theology" hinges. These points may be here 
vaguely indicated as contained in the general proposition that 
Dr. Hodge assumes certain a priori principles of the reason ivhich 

Copyright, 1874, by Wm. Macon Coleman. 



are necessary to the support of Protestantism, but which destroy 
the credibility of the Sacred Scriptures. 

A resume of the introduction to his Theology gives all the es- 
sential features of Dr. Hodge's system. He teaches as follows : 

Theology is a science. It is a science in the technical sense of 
the term — precisely as Botany and Chemistry are sciences. As 
nature furnishes all the facts for these sciences, so the Bible fur- 
nishes all the facts for Theology. As the botanist or chemist in- 
vestigates the facts of nature, arranges and classifies them, and 
generalizes laws, so does the theologian proceed with the facts 
declared in the Bible. " It " — Theology — " must embrace an 
exhibition of the internal relation of these facts, one to another, 
and each to all. It must be able to show that if one be admitted 
others can not be denied." System in Theology arises from the 
constitution of the human mind itself. The method of Theology 
is the Inductive. This assumes : 

1. The trustworthiness of the sense perceptions ; 

2. The trustworthiness of the mental operations; 

3. The certainty of those truths which are not learned from 
experience, but which are given in the constitution of our nature. 

Among these laws of belief which God has impressed upon the 
human mind are included some which have no direct application 
to the natural sciences. Such, for example, as the essential distinc- 
tion between right and wrong, that nothing contrary to virtue 
can be enjoined by God, and other similar first truths which God 
has implanted in the constitution of all moral beings, and which 
no objective revelation can possibly contradict. Thus equipped 
and restricted the theologian takes up his Bible and begins the 
work of arranging all the facts therein contained into a harmoni- 
ous and complete system. The scriptures of the Old and New 
Testament contain all the facts and are the only infallible rule 
of faith and practice. Reason has its proper office in matters of 
religion. It is necessarily pre-supposed in every revelation. 
Revelation is the communication of truth to the mind. This 
communication supposes the capacity to receive it. Truths to be 
received as objects of faith must be first intellectually appre- 
hended. The first and indispensable office of reason in matters of 
faith, is, therefore, the cognition of the truths proposed for our 
reception. There is an important distinction between knowing 
and comprehending. We cannot comprehend God, i. e. know 
him to perfection, but we may know him partially, yet really and 
as He is in himself. But reason has higher prerogatives. It is 
the judge of the credibility of revelation. That which is absurd, 
contradictory, or in violation of the laws of belief impressed upon 
us, must be rejected as unworthy of credit. The Bible is a plain 
book. It is intelligible by the people. The people are bound to 
read it and interpret it for themselves. In all things necessary 



to salvation it is sufficiently plain to be understood by the un- 
learned. There is no higher authority than the private judgment 
of the individual in determining any point of faith or practice. 

From the foregoing synopsis it is evident that Dr. Hodge main- 
tains that there are certain primary truths or original data of con- 
sciousness impressed upon our constitution which revelation presup- 
poses, and which must be our criteria in investigating its claims for 
reception, and must guide us in its interpretation when accepted. 
But this must be made out from the verbatim statements of our 
author himself. It must be shown from his own unequivocal 
language that he maintains the proposition above stated. 

In paragraph 5, page 5, vol. 1, he says of the inductive 
method, which method he adopts: "It is so called because it 
agrees in everything essential with the inductive method as ap- 
plied to the natural sciences." 

"The man of science comes to the study of nature with cer- 
tain assumptions. 1. He assumes the trustworthiness of his 
sense perceptions. Unless he can rely upon the well-authenti- 
cated testimony of his senses, he is deprived of all means of 
prosecuting his investigations. The facts of nature reveal them- 
selves to our faculties of sense, and can be known in no other 
way. 2. He must also assume the trustworthiness of his mental 
operations. He must take for granted that he can perceive, com- 
pare, combine, remember, and infer ; and that he can safely 
rely upon these mental faculties in their legitimate exercise. 
3. He must also rely on the certainty of those truths which 
are not learned from experience, but which are given in the con- 
stitution of his own nature. That every effect (event ?) must 
have a cause ; that the same cause, under like circumstances, will 
produce a like effect ; that a cause is not a mere uniform antecedent, 
but that which contains within itself the reason why the effect 
occurs." 

In the next paragraph, speaking of " the Inductive Method ap- 
plied to Theology " he remarks : 

" The Bible is to the theologian what nature is to the man of 
science. It is his store-house of facts ; and his method of ascer- 
taining what the Bible teaches, is the same as that which the 
natural philosopher adopts to ascertain what nature teaches. In 
the first place he comes to his task with all the assumptions above 
mentioned. He must assume the validity of those laws of belief 
which God has impressed on our nature." But he " comes to his 
task" with yet higher assumptions than these : " In these laws 
are included some which have no direct application to the natural 
sciences. Such, for example, as the essential distinction between 
right and wrong ; that nothing contrary to virtue can be enjoined 
by God ; that it cannot be right to do evil that good may come ; 
that sin deserves punishment and other similar first truths which 



God lias implanted in the constitution of all moral beings and 
Avhich no objective revelation can possibly contradict." 

This quotation is a formal statement by our author at the out- 
set of his work and at its appropriate place of the infallible 
knowledge in the possession of man which revelation presupposes. 
This knowledge consists not in mere logical forms of thought 
alone, but in material data, in synthetic judgments a priori, some 
of which he gives and others of which, not given, he admits. 
But not only is this infallible knowledge the test to which revela- 
tion must be subjected before it can be received, but it must also 
be the guide in its interpretation, for in his own language this 
knowledge is that " which no objective revelation can possibly con- 
tradict." 

This should be sufficient to show that Dr. Hodge maintains the 
proposition above stated. But to avoid the possible charges of 
misunderstanding our author, or misrepresenting him, or giving 
his principles a wider range than he intended, let us quote further, 
and let his own explicit declarations bear their own testimony. 

On page 49, vol. 1, under the title " Proper Office of Reason 
in Matters of Religion," we read : " The first and indispensable 
office of reason, therefore, in matters of faith, is the cognition or 
intelligent apprehension of the truths proposed for our reception." 
In the same connection, and on page 50, we read : " In the second 
place, it is the prerogative of reason to judge of the credibility of 
a revelation ;" also, on page 51, " If it" — that is anything — " is 
seen to be impossible, no authority, and no amount or kind of 
evidence can impose the obligation to receive it as true. " Imme- 
diately thereupon he proceeds to classify the impossible as 
follows: " 1. That is impossible which involves a contradiction. 
2. It is impossible that God should do, approve, or command what 
is morally wrong. 3. It is impossible that he should require us to 
believe what contradicts any of the laws of belief which he has 
impressed on our nature." Hereupon follows " Proof of this 
Prerogative of Reason," and the conclusion is given on page 52, 
in language which is sufficiently strong and explicit to fully justify 
the statement that Dr. Hodge holds the doctrine attributed to him 
as above given. "'We are," he says, " consequently, not only au- 
thorized but required to pronounce anathema on an apostle or 
angel from heaven, who should call upon us to receive as a revela- 
tion from God anything absurd, or wicked, or inconsistent with 
the intellectual or moral nature with which he has endowed us." 
It would be tedious and useless to multiply extracts. In fact 
this principle constitutes the whole groundwork of his system, 
and to give all the instances where it is formally recognized or 
indirectly presumed would be to reproduce the entire work. One 
more quotation will suffice. On page 59, paragraph 7 treats of 
" The Office of the Senses in Matters of Faith," and in the fol- 



lowing language : " The question, ' What authority is due to the 
senses in matters of faith,' arose out of the controversy between 
Romanists and Protestants. The doctrine of transubstantiation 
as taught by the Romish church contradicts our senses of sight, 
taste, and touch. It was natural for Protestants to appeal to this 
contradiction as decisive evidence against the doctrine. Roman- 
ists reply by denying the competency of the senses to bear testi- 
mony in such cases. " 

Protestants maintain the validity of that testimony on the 
following grounds: (1.) " Confidence in the well authenticated 
testimony of our senses is one of those laws of belief which God 
has impressed upon our nature ; from the authority of those laws 
it is impossible that we should emancipate ourselves." (2.) " Con- 
fidence in our senses is, therefore, one form of our confidence in 
God." (3.) " All ground of certainty in matters either of faith 
or knowledge is destroyed if confidence in the laws of our nature 
be abandoned." (4.) " All external, supernatural revelation is 
addressed to the senses." 

It seems, therefore, to be established from his own explicit and 
unmistakable declarations that Dr. Hodge holds and defends the 
doctrine that the human mind, in virtue of its own constitution and 
independent of revelation or any supernatural influence, is in posses- 
sion of certain original truths and laws of belief ivliich constitute a 
tribunal of the last resort, and are of paramount authority in mat- 
ters of faith. 

The first inquiry which naturally suggest itself is, what are 
these original truths and laws of belief? It is to be regreted 
that our author has not formally set forth truths and laws of such 
transcendent moment in exhaustive categories. But he has no- 
where done so. He has explicitly given some here and some there, 
and some he has not explicitly given but has presumed. How- 
ever, he has given them, at least some of them, and given them 
with sufficient clearness and distinctness. It will not be denied 
that he includes among these the following : 

1. The validity of the testimony of the senses. 

2. The existence of finite substances, and the corelation between 
these and their attributes. 

3. The corelation between cause and effect. 

4. The infinity of time and space. 

5. That freedom is the condition of moral action. 

6. That there is an essential distinction between right and wrong. 

7. That God can do no wrong. 

It may be observed in passing, that the merely formal or logi- 
cal laws of thought have been excluded from the above catagory 
as immaterial to the argument, and only those taken which have 
a positive content, or, in other words, are synthetical judgments. 

In reflecting upon these principles in the light in which they 



are viewed by our author, we are overwhelmed by their awful 
grandeur. They are not merely relatively true for us. They are not 
merely truths which are adapted indeed to our intellectual and moral 
nature as at present constituted, but which we may shake off and 
soar far above and beyond in a future and higher state of exist- 
ence. They constitute truth for all intelligences which ever have 
existed and which it is possible for God to create. They are ab- 
solute truths. What does that mean ? It means that they are 
laws and conditions imposed upon the nature of God himself, and 
that His thought and His action are restricted within their limita- 
tions. God must think and act under the law of cause and effect ; 
God must think in time and act in space ; and this thought and 
action must conform to the laws of duration aud extension. As 
man thinks and acts under the laws of cause and effect, and space 
and time, in the same mode and kind does God think and act. 
The same things which are immutable and eternal truths for God 
are such for man. Both God and man are in possession of iden- 
tical cognitions and apprehend them with like consciousness. 
They constitute within their sphere the limits and the laws of the 
human and Divine intelligence and action. As the child is 
to the sage, so man stands related to God. As the child partakes 
of the nature of the man, so man partakes of the nature of God 
in cognizing these immutable and eternal truths. Before ever a 
world was launched into space, before a created intelligence was- 
brought forth, in that past when the Triune God was alone in time 
and space, these self-same truths which the human minds possesses 
existed in the Divine mind, immutable as He is immutable, co- 
etaneous and co-existent with His own eternity. 
• These truths, according to our author, God has revealed to us. 
Not by any external objective revelation, but in the very constitu- 
tion of our nature. He has so framed us that we see them by their 
ow r n light, and seeing them, at once recognize them and bow to 
their paramount authority. God has likewise given us an exter- 
nal revelation, but the internal revelation made in the constitution 
of our nature is more worthy, in that it is the judge which passes 
upon the merits of the other and is the supreme judge of its in- 
terpretation. 

Such, then, is the dignity and nature of these truths as regarded 
by our author. 

" Now, to think at all, there must be some object of thought. This 
object of thought must conform to the laws of thought, i. e. with 
the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. We 
cannot think a round square or an unjust justice. What cannot 
be thought in this sense is impossible. Not merely impossible for 
us or impossible to human thought, but absolutely impossible — 
impossible to God himself — for he has revealed these truths to us 
in our nature, and they are also His truths. 



7 " 

With these premises, which our author will admit — for they are 
his own — we proceed to consider separately the seven principles 
above stated, and to consider them by and through the light of 
principles admittedly of equal authority, 

1. The validity of the testimony of the senses. 

Now, whatever questions may arise about the appropriate sphere 
of the senses, our author will not deny that the senses give in tes- 
timony — 

(a) The existence of an external world, 

(b) That world existing as it appears. 

Now, this deliverance of sense may be called in question in both 
particulars. It cannot in either instance stand the test of the two 
criteria of necessity and universality recognized by our author. 

(a) The existence of an external world. 

As a matter of fact, consciousness teaches that it is not impossi- 
ble or absurd, nay, not even unreasonable to suppose that I am 
conscious of only a subjective mode of the ego. So much for the 
necessity of the belief. As to its universality, the fact is that sys- 
tems of philosophy have had their day which were founded upon 
a denial of this belief. 

(b) That world existing as it appears. 

What has just been remarked may be repeated here, with the 
.additional fact that the great body of philosophers, until within 
quite recent times, have held that our knowledge of the external 
world was not immediate, presentative knowledge, but mediate 
and representative knowledge ; that a tertium quid intervened, 
and that this, and not the external world, was the immediate ob- 
ject of consciousness. 

Now, even if our author had set out a principle which could 
stand the test of necessity and universality, he would yet be wide 
as the poles from establishing it upon the immutable basis which 
he claims. But, as just shown, not even this is accomplished. 
The principle is, then, to be abandoned. 

It would be competent to argue that if our author has failed 
in making out his claim for a single one of these principles, he has 
failed in all. For if these principles are simple, original, seen of 
their own light and necessarily enforcing belief, what assurance is 
there that if we are mistaken in one we are not mistaken in all ? 

2. The existence of finite substances, and the corelation between 
them and their attributes. 

Absolute existence is impossible to thought, and in this, impos- 
sible to us. What we cannot think cannot exist for us. It is a 
void and unknown x, of which nothing can be predicated. To 
say that nothing can be predicated of it is to say that it is un- 
known, unknowable, incogitable, inconceivable, impossible. Not 
known in some feeble degree, partially and obscurely known, but 
utterlv and absolutelv unknown, and out of all relation to our facul- 



8 

ties. For us, then, absolute existence is incogitable and impossi- 
ble. For absolute existence is existence without conditions, and 
to think is to condition. Thus to think absolute existence is to 
think existence neither in time or in space, nor in relation .to our 
faculties of cognition. Is it possible for us to conceive or intuite 
existence and not at the same time to conceive or intuite it as ex- 
isting in time and space ? Is it possible for us to conceive or in- 
tuite existence and at the same time not to conceive or intuite it 
in relation to our consciousness ? Existence, then, can only be ap- 
prehended under the relations and conditions of time and space,, 
material existence both in space and time and immaterial exist- 
ence at least in time. 

Next, what is substance? Or rather what is substance as re- 
garded by our author? It is that which remains after we ab- 
stract all the sensible properties of an object. It cannot, then, 
be an object of the senses. It is, therefore, an object of conscious- 
ness. This object of consciousness we are impelled by a law of 
our nature to believe existing externally in time and space. Now, 
an object of consciousness must conform to the laws of thought. 
It must neither be felo de se, or be a mere negation of positive 
knowledge, or zero. If either of these conditions remain unful- 
filled, then the conception or intuition — not once to speak of the 
external reality — of substance is impossible. What, then, is the 
positive content of thought when the word "substance" is em- 
ployed ? We have seen that it is not an object of the senses, 
hence no image can be construed to the imagination. Let us now 
make the effort to think it. It is that which exists by. itself. 
(quod substut per se.) It is that which can be thought only 
through and by means of its properties. In other words, we think 
substance as an existence independent of qualities, which exist- 
ence can only be thought by and through its qualities. That is, 
we think it necessarily existing by itself in necessary connection 
and relation with something else. This conception is suicidal. It 
is contrary to a law of our nature. It contains within itself its 
own destruction. It is self-contradictory. Beyond this conscious- 
ness we cannot go. 

In what has just been remarked. the conception has been con- 
sidered as involving a knowledge of substance by and through 
its properties. This has been seen to be self-contradictory. If, on 
the other hand, we attempt to conceive or intuite substance in and 
through itself, the effort is vain, w T e have mere negation, a 
vacuity, a nothing. 

The validity of this principle must, therefore, be given up, as 
the principle itself is shown to be either a self contradiction or a 
mere negation of thought. 

3. The eor ■elation between cause and effect. 

By this proposition is not simply meant that an effect is that 



which has a cause. This would merely be an identical proposi- 
tion equivalent to saying that "effect" was "effect." It means 
in the sense of our author, that there is a positive dictum of con- 
sciousness, or in other words, revelation of God's eternal truth to 
man in his intellectual nature that spontaneity of existence is 
impossible ; that out of nothing, nothing can originate its own 
existence. 

We tread here a well-worn path. To undertake to set forth 
the difficulties which accompany the doctrine of causality would 
be to write the history of speculative philosophy. We shall con- 
tent ourselves with a single quotation from a distinguished thinker, 
not adduced as authority, but intended to convey what we mean 
to say in the most simple, intelligible and forcible language possi- 
ble : 

" If there be postulated an express and positive affirmation of 
intelligence to account for the fact that existence cannot absolutely 
commence, we must equally postulate a counter affirmation of in- 
telligence, positive and express, to explain the counter fact that 
existence cannot infinitely not commence. The one necessity of 
the mind is equally strong as the other; and if the one be a posi- 
tive dictum, an express testimony of intelligence, so also must be 
the other. But they are contradictories ; and, as contradictories, 
they cannot both be true." 

This principle must also be discarded, unless we consent to adopt 
the alternative that God has revealed a lie. 

4. The infinity of time and space. 

It is to be remarked at the outset that there can be no such 
thing as a "vague," a ''feeble," a "limited" knowledge of the 
infinite in time and space. We either have the cognition of the 
infinite, or we do not have it. A middle ground is not possible. 
If this proposition be true, then God himself is limited and con- 
ditioned by time and space. 

It is not difficult to show the contradictions and absurdities 
which flow from the assumption of a conception of this infinite. 
We can prove with equal force of reason that the Universe had 
a beginning in time and that it had no beginning in time ; that it 
is bounded in space and that it is not bounded in space. We can 
prove that a whole is equal to less than the sum of its parts ; and 
that the sum of two wholes taken together is equal to one of the 
wholes by itself. To illustrate. Infinite time is time which has 
no end. One infinite time has past and one lies in the future, 
The infinite time which is past is no greater now than it was a 
million years ago, and yet, this million years is a part of the in- 
finity of past time. Thus the whole is equal to less than the sum 
of its parts. Again. The infinity which is past is equal to the 
infinity which is yet to come. These are two separate w T holes. 
But these two infinities added together make no more than one of 



10 

the wholes ; the sum of two wholes is equal to one whole alone. 
It would be easy to multiply contradictions and absurdities. One 
illustration from space will be sufficient. Let it be required to 
prove that a cubic inch of matter may be made to occupy infinite 
space. Space is composed of an infinite number of smaller spaces. 
Matter is infinitely divisible. A cubic inch of matter may be di- 
vided into an infinite number of parts. With an infinite number 
of parts you can fill infinite space. Hence a cubic inch may fill 
the Universe. 

Such are the contradictions and absurdities which flow from the 
assumption of a cognition of the infinite in time and space. If 
there be any revelation of God to man in his own intellectual na- 
ture, the axioms of geometry must be among them, and an as- 
sumption which sets these aside is not to be entertained for a mo- 
ment. ■ 

5. Freedom is a condition of moral action. 

It is to be observed that the four principles which have just 
been considered are derived from our intellectual nature, and that 
the three which are to follow are derived from our moral nature. 
In point of dignity and authority they are all held equal by our 
author, who regards them all alike as revelations of immutable 
and eternal truths made by God to man in the constitution of his 
nature. 

The three propositions, Freedom is essential to moral action ; 
There is an essential distinction between right and wrong ; and 
God can do no wrong ; possess a quality of their own. There is 
one aspect in which they are true and another aspect in which 
they are false. If we derive our notions about freedom and right 
and wrong by what God's infallible church teaches, then these 
propositions are true. But if we determine upon the the authority 
of our own reason what is freedom and what is right and wrong, 
and claim that it is reason's prerogative to so determine indepen- 
dent of revelation, and accordingly subject the claims of revelation 
to the ultimate tribunal erected by reason, then these propositions 
are false and destructive of all religion. It is in this latter sense 
that our author holds them, for he explicitly states that revelation 
presupposes these truths, and that they are revelations of God to 
us in our nature, hence infallible. 

To recur, then, to the consideration of the proposition, " Free- 
dom is a condition of moral action." 

Now, freedom is the quality of an act of the will. The notion 
of freedom is given in consciousness. But an act of the will is an 
effect from a preceding cause, and that cause in turn an effect of 
a preceding cause, and so on ad- infinitum. Hence the will does 
not determine itself, but is determined by causes. But this is to 
deny freedom to the will, and this is to deny a moral universe and 
a moral governor of the universe. 



> 



11 

Here we see an infallible revelation made to ns in our moral 
nature — freedom — destroyed by an infallible revelation made to 
us in our intellectual nature — causality — on the authority of a 
third infallible revelation which forbids us to violate a law of 
thought — non-contradiction ! 

6. There is an essential distinction between right and wrong. 

The constitution of our nature tells us that this particular ac- 
tion is right and that particular action is wrong. Not relatively 
right and wrong, i. e. right and wrong only for us, but absolutely 
and immutably right and wrong ; right and wrong for God him- 
self. But the testimony of our senses in the matter of God's deal- 
ing with the world gives that in evidence, which, on the assump- 
tion of these original truths, the constitution of our moral nature 
impels ns to pronounce unjust. 

7. God can do no wrong. 

This proposition — of course in the sense in which our author 
holds it — that is, that it is the prerogative of reason to declare 
what is right and what is wrong independent of revelation — this 
proposition is liable to the same criticism as the proposition imme- 
diately preceding. In both we see one law of our nature contra- 
dicted by another law of our nature. In both we see human rea- 
son staggering in darkness and despair, treading round and round 
in the same circle unable to escape from the labyrinth of its own 
contradictions. 

We have thus seen that Dr. Hodge maintains that the human 
mind is in possession of certain native, original, a priori truths, 
not derived from experience or from an objective revelation, but 
which are immediate revelations of God to our moral and intel- 
lectual nature. We have seen the supreme dignity which must 
attach to these truths if they be allowed ; that they are absolute, 
eternal and immutable ; that they are laws springing out of the 
nature of God himself; that they limit and condition His exist- 
ence and cognition ; and. as such, are of transcendent and para- 
mount authority for us. It necessarily follows, as our author 
explicitly declares, " that no objective revelation can possibly con- 
tradict them." We have seen what some of these alleged original 
truths are, and also what are some of the inevitable contradictions 
and absurdities which result from accepting them as such. 

But Dr. Hodge declares that, unless these truths be accepted, 
"the root of our nature is a lie;" knowledge impossible and 
faith a delusion ! But these alleged truths have been shown to be 
absurd and contradictory. The result is inexorable. Holding these 
truths he must give up his religion, or cleaving to his religion he 
must abandon these truths. 

The argument to show that both knowledge and faith are im- 
possible, if we accept the validity of these so-called first princi- 
ples as understood by our author, might safely be rested here. Logic 



12 

requires nothing more. But for the sake of further clearness 
and distinctness, and to render this discussion as perspicuous and 
as forcible as it is possible for us to make it, we proceed to its illus- 
tration. 

1. It is a fact of human consciousness that these alleged intui- 
tions of the reason or these assumed infallible revelations from God 
himself as they may he called, imperatively demand that God should 
be conceived as Absolute and Infinite Being. It is equally true 
that these same intuitions constrain us with an equal cogency to con- 
ceive God as a person. But the conception of God as Absolute and 
Infinite Being is inconsistent with the conception of God as a per- 
son. Ergo, these intuitions or revelations are contradictory and un- 
worthy of belief. 

The following considerations may be useful in elucidating and 
illustrating the foregoing thesis. 

The existence of a God is the necessary foundation of all the- 
ology and religion. It is likewise the beginning and the end of 
all human thought and speculation. We awake to consciousness 
to find ourselves distinct from something else. That which 
thinks and wills, and remembers and reasons, or, in other words, 
the thinking subject, the ego, the me, is not the object which is 
intuited or thought. The two are essentially separate and dis- 
tinct. As the thinking subject is related to the external world, 
so are the multiplied objects of the external world related to each 
other. They are definitely related — related under limitations — as 
the thinking subject is also related to them. Thus, distinction, 
relation, and limitation is the condition of consciousness. But at 
the same time, this existence is conceived as dependent ; that 
is, not as having its existence in itself, but as existing in and 
through something else as its ground or cause of existence. This 
ground of existence is the Absolute. But the Absolute must be 
one — not two, or many. Hence, existence extended in space, or 
matter, and existence protensive in time, or spirit, must both have 
the same common ground or substratum of existence. This coi% 
mon ground or substratum of existence is absolute substance, 
and this manifests itself under the two attributes of conscious- 
ness and extension. The same result is reached if either the 
object or the subject of consciousness be denied reality, or, if 
both subject and object be destroyed in thought. In the first 
instance, the result is ideal Pantheism ; in the second, it is ma- 
terial Pantheism, and in the third, it is the Pantheism of the 
development of thought. All these systems are essentially the 
same. It is the one which is permanent, and which is the ground 
of all things else. 

The history of human thought has verified this utterance of 
consciousness. Dr. Hodge grapples in vain with the Absolute. 
In vain he repudiates its definition. In vain he strives to set up 



13 

a personal ruler of the Universe in its stead. His own intui- 
tions of the reason, those infallible revelations of God to man, 
given in human consciousness, overwhelm him. They demand 
the Absolute, and will not rest satisfied with anything less. This 
Absolute must not only be the ground of all being but it must 
embrace all being.. It must fill all time and occupy all space. 
It is Infinite. It is the All. 

This conception of the Absolute is clearly inconsistent with 
the conception of personality. If God be the All, he is only 
personal as he comes to personality in man, for personality is 
only a portion of the All. 

These intuitions which demand the existence of an impersonal 
Absolute are in direct contradiction with intuitions of equal 
authority which demand the existence of a personal Ruler of the 
Universe. The former are derived from our intellectual nature, 
the latter from our moral nature. These intuitions from our 
moral nature give us the sense of right and wrong, the sense of 
freedom and of moral responsibility. In giving these as immut- 
able and eternal, there is given at the same time a moral universe 
and with it a moral Governor of the Universe, or a personality. 
Which of these two classes of our infallible intuitions shall we 
receive? Shall we conclude with reason that God is the Abso- 
lute ; or shall we decide with conscience that God is a person ? 

2. But even if the conception of the Absolute be repudiated, the 
conception of the Divine Being, as given by Dr. Hodge, is equally 
self-contradictory and absurd. 

In vol. 1, page 33cS, we read : " While, therefore, it is admitted 
not only that the Infinite God is incomprehensible and that our 
knowledge of Him is both partial and imperfect ; that there is 
much in God which we do not know at all, and that what we do 
know we know very imperfectly, nevertheless our knowledge, as 
far as it goes, is true knowledge. God really is what we believe 
Him to be, so far as our idea of Him is determined by the revela- 
tion which He has made of Himself in His works in the consti- 
tution of our nature, in His word, and in the person of His Son. 
To know is simply to have such apprehensions of an object as con- 
form to what that object really is. We know what the word 
"spirit" means. We know what the words "infinite," "eternal," 
and ''immutable" mean. And, therefore, the sublime proposi- 
tion, pregnant with more truth than was ever compressed in any 
other sentence, "God is a spirit, infinite, eternal and immutable," 
conveys to the mind as distinct an idea, and as true '(i. e. trust- 
worthy) knowledge, as the proposition, " The human soul is a 
spirit." In this sense God is an object of knowledge. He is not 
the unknown God, because He is infinite. Knowledge in Him 
does not cease to be knowledge because it is omniscience ; power 



14 

does not cease to be power because it is omnipotence, any more 
than space ceases to be space because it is infinite." 

Startling paradox ! Confusion worse confounded ! '' God is a 
spirit, infinite." Spirit is substance and infinite substance is all 
substance. Yet finite substance exists which is not a part of infi- 
nite substance. As much as to say that finite space is not a part 
of infinite space ! " God is eternal." But every moment of His 
existence His eternity is being augmented. It is greater now than 
it was at the creation. It will be greater at the consummation of 
all things than it is now! "He is immutable." But He passes 
from repose into creation! Such a. Being we are called upon to 
construe to our minds ; thus is thought called upon to commit the 
suicidal act of thinking in violation of its own laws. It will not 
avail for Dr. Hodge to urge that " God is infinitely exalted above 
our loftiest conceptions," that "the finite cannot comprehend the 
infinite," that " these are mysteries before which human reason 
should bow in silence and reverence." If language have any- 
meaning at all, he means to assert distinctly that our knowledge 
of God is true knowledge as far as it extends, and that so far, this 
knowledge gives us God as he really exist. But, if true knowl- 
edge, we may reason upon it, and evolve infallible conclusions 
if we reason in conformity with the infallible laws of belief 
and the infallible dicta of consciousness "revealed" to us in 
the constitution of our nature. Not only may we so reason, 
but this reasoning is necessarily imposed upon us by these 
same laws. The conception of such a being, therefore, being 
involved in absurdity and contradiction, the infallible laws im- 
posed upon our nature necessitate the belief that such a being 
has no existence. Escaping from the Scylla of Pantheism our 
author is swallowed up in the Charybdis of Atheism. This is 
a conclusion he would repudiate with horror, but is there any 
alternative when once the infallibility of the truths revealed 
to us in our nature has been recognized and accepted ? But 
further. 

We have already seen that the nature of these intuitive truths 
as held by our author is such that " no objective revelation can 
possibly contradict them." 

But it is a fact that the Scriptures do contradict them. The 
Bible declares that the soul is immortal. The testimony of the 
senses contradicts it. Consequently the Bible is to be rejected. 

This testimony is not a mere negation. It is a positive asser- 
tion that the soul is mortal. We see two infants, male and 
female, slumbering on their mothers' breasts. They are two sepa- 
rate and distinct creatures, each a sentient, rational organism. 
There is no. third existence in esse. The infants grow from child- 
hood to maturer years. That which was not, begins to exist. The 
germ of a third existence begins to develop, and a child is born 



15 

: into the world to be subject in turn to the law of reproduction and 
decay. The senses give us the child as a unit, as a single thing. 
It grows and develops its material organism and its sensible facul- 
ties till it arrives at the full vigor of manhood. The germ has 
become a flower, the flower has ripened into fruit and' the fruit 
begins to decay. The head begins to whiten, the hearing to fail, 
the eyes to grow dim, and the steps to totter. The mental facul- 
ties fall under the same law. The memory loses its power of re- 
tention, the will vascilates, and the intellect has forgot its cun- 
ning. Dissolution approaches. Where, now, is that indomitable 
will and that over-mastering intellect? Both lie in ruins. The 
physical organism has almost worn out, and the mental faculties 
have dimmed almost to darkness. Finally comes Death and physi- 
cal and mental organism are both extinguished. Where, now, is 
will and memory and reason ? Where is conscious existence ? 
The senses affirm that the individual organism has ceased to ex- 
ist. That which began has ceased to be — no more. The eye can- 
not see, the ear hear, or the lips speak. Consciousness will not 
respond to your touch, touch you ever so sharply. Sense repeats 
the natural law of decay and reproduction and the destruction of 
the individual. 

Is not this argument against the immortality of the soul fully 
as conclusive as the argument employed by our author against the 
mystery of transubstantiation ? Both contradict the testimony of 
the senses, and both, on his assumption, must be rejected. 

Let us now consider those two sublime attributes of God which 
most nearly concern us as responsible creatures — His justice and 
His goodness. ♦ 

1. The conception of justice given, in consciousness co?itradicts the 
character of God as given in the Bible. 

The Bible declares that God inflicts punishment upon the chil- 
dren for the sins of their fathers to the third and fourth genera- 
tion. Under the Mosaic law children were put to death for the 
sins of their parents. God commanded Saul to smite Amalek and 
" to slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, 
camel and ass." The Lord hardened the heart of Pharoah, and 
He hardened the hearts of the Caiianites that they might come 
against Israel in battle and be destroyed. He created man and 
let him wander in darkness and ignorance, and selected only Abra- 
ham as the father of a race to w T hom He would reveal His will. 
To crown the whole, He sent his innocent Son into the world to 
bear the whole weight of the punishment due to guilty man. Will 
Dr. Hodge pretend, will any one pretend, for a moment to. deny 
that the Bible contradicts our a priori notion of justice? 

2. The conception of goodness given in consciousness ' contradicts 
the character of God as given in the Bible. 

It will be sufficient in this connection to state that the Bible 



16 

affirms the existence of evil. This is fatally inconsistent with the 
conception of infinite Goodness given us in our moral constitution. 
That a Being of infinite Goodness should allow pain and suffering 
and death among creatures which He had made is impossible to 
moral consciousness. The existence of evil is shown both by- 
revelation and experience, and in virtue of the alleged infallible 
authority of the primal truths w T e must reject not only revelation 
but a moral governor of the Universe, and be plunged once more 
in the abyss of Atheism. 

Further, the a priori conception of the immutability of God 
destroys the doctrine of His providential dealings with man and 
renders prayer a nullity and an absurdity. The a priori concep- 
tion of His foreknowledge is the conception of necessity. It des- 
troys freedom both in God and man, makes moral government an 
impossibility, and declares the warnings, the invitations and pro- 
mises of Scripture to be solemn mockeries. 

It avails nothing, as before remarked, to assert that these are 
mysteries beyond the reach of human conception. Such an argu- 
ment is not competent in the mouth of one w T ho maintains that 
God has revealed certain infallible truths in the constitution of 
our nature. We have already seen what the nature of these truths 
must be. They are not relative for us, but truths which bind all 
possible intelligence. They are truths which arise out of the na- 
ture of God himself, are the objects of Divine cognition in the 
same sense that they are the objects of human cognition, and, as 
such, are absolute, immutable and eternal. Hence these truths 
must not be in conflict with each other, or with the character of 
God as given either in nature or in revelation. If they are in 
conflict in any one of these cases, and in a single instance, then 
we must either — 

(a) Keject the authority of these truths, or — 

(b) Reject the authority of the external revelation. 

But our author holds, as we have seen, that revelation presup- 
poses the existence of these truths; that they are the necessary 
conditions of the possibility of an external revelation. The con- 
sequence is inexorable. Holding these truths our author must, 
logically, abandon objective revelation. 

This concludes the argument. It remains briefly to consider 
the proposition made in the outset, that the assumption of these 
alleged first truths is a necessity of Protestantism. 

Protestantism professes to believe in a personal God, in the im- 
mortality of the soul, in moral responsibility, and in a future state 
of rewards and punishments. It further professes to believe that 
the Holy Scriptures are of Divine authority, and that a method 
of salvation for sinful man is therein revealed. The claims of the 
Church, of God are rejectee]. There is no infallible teacher admit- 
ted to interpret what this method is. Each individual must dis- 



17 

cover this for himself at the peril of his eternal damnation if he 
should mistake. But admitting this objective revelation to be of 
Divine authority, it still remains to show how is this authority to 
be testified to us who were not witnesses of our Lord's resurrec- 
tion from the dead. A supernatural revelation cannot rest upon- 
human testimony. In that case faith would be merely human. 
The testimony must be the supernatural testimony of God him- 
self. This much Protestantism admits, and in rejecting the testi- 
mony of God through His Church, it sets up a direct and immediate 
infallible revelation of God to man in what are called "the intui- 
tions of the reason " or " the original truths of consciousness" 

Else how could private judgment have anything to found upon 
in pursuing its investigation? What would be its tribunal in the 
last resort unless these ultimate truths are assumed ? In the ab- 
sence of these assumed truths there would be no foot-hold for its 
system, not even an apparent ground for its faith. Nor is it com- 
petent for Protestantism to reply that the Holy Spirit bears wit- 
ness to the truth in each individual consciousness. For it is one 
of the essential doctrines of that system that the Holy Spirit only 
works in conjunction with the Word. Protestantism is compelled 
to assert, and does assert, that the testimony of the Spirit is only 
given when the external revelation is first intellectually appre- 
hended in its true and proper meaning. The work of the Spirit 
is with the soul, not with the intellect. It merely illuminates. 
W T hen the truth has been first rightly apprehended by the under- 
standing, then the soul is opened to its appreciation. Thus the 
work of the Spirit is conditioned upon the proper exercise of the 
intellectual faculties. And it is the intellectual faculties which 
first determine — 

(a) What is to be received as the word of God ; and 

(b) What is its import and meaning. 

According to Protestantism, the Holy Spirit is not co-operative 
in this process. For if this were maintained, it would be to main- 
tain that the Spirit teaches error, inasmuch as there is a vast di- 
versity of opinion among Protestants as to what God has actually 
revealed. To avoid this consequence, Protestantism limits the ac- 
tion of the Spirit to that condition of the mind and soul w T here 
the truth has been previously properly apprehended. But of such 
critical moment is the work to be performed by the intellectual 
faculties in the attainment of the truth, that Protestantism dare 
not rest its claims upon the exercise of these faculties as merely 
human. A supernatural testimony must be at hand, and this su- 
pernatural testimony is found in the "revelations made to us in 
our nature, which no objective revelation can possibly contradict. ," 

More than three hundred years have now elapsed since Luther 
undertook to establish a system of religious Faith founded upon 
the doctrine of private judgment, in opposition to the authorita- 



18 

tive teachings of an infallible Church. In the meanwhile, Protes- 
tantism has been working out its inevitable results. In Northern 
Germany, the land of its birth, the few articles of belief which 
gave it color of title to be called a church have been repudiated ; 
private judgment has logically developed into rationalism ; Pan- 
theism has usurped the place of the living God ; and the boasted 
principles of civil and religious liberty find their expression to- 
day in imperialism and religious persecution. In England a 
woman is at the head of an establishment torn to pieces by an 
incurable schism, and the philosophy of Bacon and Locke has 
been succeeded in turn by that of Spencer and Darwin. 

Our own country presents to our view a paradise of sectarian- 
ism. In the process of universal disintegration, division follows 
upon division, split succeeds split, one individual congregation 
after another sets up with a distinctive creed of its own to go to 
pieces again in turn, until every handful of fanatics who can rent 
a hall and pay an occasional speaker arrogate to themselves the 
claims of the Church of God ! 

Protestantism began with a protest against the authority of the 
Church and has ended with a protest against all religion. In vain 
do a few theologians like Dr. Hodge, still adhering to the older 
schools of so-called orthodoxy, make the effort to stem the rising 
tide of Atheism which is roaring around them. Their essential 
principles are too powerful to be successfully resisted in their na- 
tural consequences. The protestant press, protestant literature, 
protestant philosophy and protestant society is Atheistic to the 
core. True to its principles, its " progressive spirit " is still widen- 
ing and extending the broad basis of its " liberality." This broad 
liberality is everywhere proclaimed. There are liberal views 
about religion, liberal views about marriage, liberal views about 
property, and liberal views about common honesty. All Divine 
sanctions are repudiated. All authority, except the authority of 
private opinion, is discarded as a relic of superstition and barbar- 
ism. There are no stable foundations for society or government. 
As private judgment is the rule of faith and practice in matters 
of religion, it is likewise the supreme arbiter in human laws. It 
gives Individualism in the State, and Spiritualism, Free-loveism 
and Beecherism in the conventicles. Protestantism stands as a 
half-way house between the Church of God and Atheism. Ra- 
tionalistic in its principles, it yet shudders to draw the legitimate 
conclusions. It would save morality, save a personal God and 
save the immortality of the soul, while it denies the authority 
upon which alone these can be established. The logical thought 
of the age is forcing an exodus from the tottering edifice of the 
so-called orthodox Protestantism in two directions. The one direc- 
tion is into the bosom of the Catholic Church, and the other is 
into the Atheism of what is known as modern science. In this 



19 

conflict between Faitli and Atheism there can be but two parties: 
the Church on the one hand, and the sufficiency of human reason 
on the other. There is no middle ground. If the writer of this 
essay has contributed anything towards showing that no such mid- 
dle ground exists, he will be satisfied. 






























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